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The Alleged Necessity of 
Microfoundations* 
It is often said that models in the microfoundations literature derive macroeconomic 
results from the theory of individual behavior only. This paper examines two of the 
assumptions that are usually made in these models: market clearing and rational 
expectations. In the context of simple models it is shown that only in some special 
cases these assumptions can be derived from the fundamental notion that individ- 
uals behave rationally. Thus, the usual rationale for the microfoundations literature 
is challenged. The paper concludes with a more modest rationale for the "necessity" 
of microfoundations. 
1. Introduction 
Macroeconomics i in need of a microeconomic foundation. 
Nowadays, this is a widely accepted doctrine in the economics 
profession. Most economists take the necessity for a microeconomic 
foundation for granted. If arguments in favor of the necessity for 
microfoundations are cited, they often are of the following reduc- 
tionist form. Society consists of individuals who are the only sub- 
jects that make economic decisions. So, in order to explain what is 
going on in the economy as a whole--for example, unemployment, 
inflation, business cycles--we have to understand the individual de- 
cisions from which a particular situation originates. I think that this 
"'reductionist credo" itself is largely correct. However, if it is used 
as an argument in favor of the necessity for microeconomic foun- 
dations it is presupposed either that microeconomics i only con- 
cerned with individual behavior or that all microeconomic propo- 
sitions can be derived from statements concerning individual decision 
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making. In this paper I will claim that both presuppositions are not 
correct: current microeconomics i , in my opinion, in need of an 
individualistic foundation. Because the microfoundations literature 
employs microeconomic models that lack individualistic foundations, 
a rationale for the microfoundations project cannot be derived from 
the above reductionist credo. 
Some economists are inclined to regard the distinction be- 
tween microeconomics and macroeconomics a a distinction be- 
tween theories of individual behavior and theories concerning the 
economy as a whole. To these economists the above claim may seem 
to be paradoxical because for them microeconomics is by definition 
a theory of individual behavior. However, there are others who ar- 
gue that this is not an appropriate demarcation criterion (see, for 
example, Machlup 1963 and Weintraub 1979). The term micro- 
foundations is widely employed by new classical as well as new 
Keynesian economists for general equilibrium models that employ 
market clearing and rational expectations. In particular, new clas- 
sical economists regard the adoption of market clearing and rational 
expectations as the only theoretically sound method to explain eco- 
nomic time series or, even more boldly, the only way to do eco- 
nomics properly (see Lucas 1981, 215-17). In order to make sense 
of this way of employing the term microfoundations we have to view 
general equilibrium theory as a part of microeconomics. General 
equilibrium theory is, however, frequently applied to economy-wide 
phenomena as well so that, according to the above demarcation cri- 
terion, it is also a part of macroeconomics. In my opinion this shows 
a fundamental weakness of the usefulness of this type of criterion 
to demarcate microeconomics from macroeconomics. 
Another way to distinguish microeconomics and macroeco- 
nomics is to distinguish between a theory of the allocation of a given 
quantity of resources (microeconomics) and a theory of output and 
employment determination (macroeconomics). In what follows I will 
employ the terms microeconomics and macroeconomics in this way. 
When discussing individual behavior I simply use the phrase "the- 
ories of individual behavior." As a historical note it is interesting 
that traditionally the discipline was divided into the Theory of Value 
and Distribution on the one hand and the Theory of Money on the 
other hand. The distinction between microeconomics and macro- 
economics became popular only after Keynes' General Theory (see 
Varian 1987). Keynes (1936, 292-93) made the following observa- 
tion. 
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The division of Economics between the Theory of Value and 
Distribution on the one hand and the Theory of Money on 
the other hand is, I think, a false division. The right dichot- 
omy is, I suggest, between the Theory of the Individual In- 
dustry or Firm and of the rewards and the distribution of a 
given quantity of resources on the one hand and the Theory 
of Output and Employment as a whole on the other hand. 
The concepts of microeeonomics and macroeconomics became as- 
sociated with Keynes's distinction between the Theory of the In- 
dividual Firm and the Theory of Aggregate Output and Employ- 
ment, respectively. The General Theory certainly shaped the field 
of macroeconomics, and a change with respect o content associated 
the change in terminology in this field. This cannot be said of mi- 
croeconomics. Microeeonomics i still concerned with Theories of 
Value and Distribution and not only with theories of individual 
households or firms. 
If it is granted that the rationale for the necessity of micro- 
foundations (given in the beginning of the paper) fails, one may 
wonder whether other rationales exist. Some authors (for example, 
Hahn 1983, 223) pose that there cannot be two separate subjects 
(microeconomics and macroeconomics) within one discipline. In other 
words, there can only be one economic theory and the rationale 
for providing macroeeonomics with microfoundations is to unify the 
two subjects. General equilibrium theorists, of course, believe that 
their theory should be used as the basis of this unification. Al- 
though unification is a legitimate goal to achieve scientific progress, 
it will be clear that providing macroeconomics with a microeco- 
nomic foundation is a necessity only from a general equilibrium point 
of view (compare Shubik 1975). 
The rest of the paper elaborates upon the above observations 
and illustrates the arguments in the .context of simple models. In 
Sections 2 and 3 the observation that microeeonomics is in need of 
an individualistic foundation will be supported by demonstrating that 
the hypotheses of rational expectations and market clearing are in 
need of individualistic foundations. In the remainder of the paper 
I will show that the microfoundations project can be regarded as a 
general equilibrium research methodology in which the difficulties 
of providing the market clearing assumption and the rational ex- 
pectations hypothesis with individualistic foundations are left un- 
discussed. 
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2. "Rational" Expectations 
It is well known that a variety of rational expectations hy- 
potheses exists (see Frydman and Phelps 1983). The most fre- 
quently employed hypothesis is of the following form. 
REH The subjective expectation of all individuals equals the 
objective mathematical expectation of the relevant heory con- 
ditioned on the data available when the expectation was formed. 
In this section I will show that there are a number of cases in which 
there is no theory of rational behavior on the part of individual 
agents from which this form of the rational expectations hypothesis 
can be derived. Most critical discussions either challenge the de- 
scriptive adequacy of the REH or they doubt whether agents are 
able to learn the "true" (parameters of the) model (see Frydman 
1982). Instead, I will criticize the internal consistency of the REH. 
Specifically, I will assume that agents know the true model, and I 
will discuss whether the REH is a logical consequence of rational 
individual behavior in models where at least two rational agents are 
distinguished. In this respect the analysis below differs from Hal- 
tiwanger and Waldman (1989) because their paper shows that it is 
not rational to have expectations that conform to the REH if some 
agents have adaptive expectations, that is, they behave irrationally. 
First, I discuss a case in which both the government and the 
public act as rational agents. It is shown that there are two relevant 
theories of rational behavior which prescribe two different actions. 
This first case abstracts from the fact that the public is not one 
rational agent. The second case distinguishes multiple rational agents 
within the public, but abstracts from the fact that the government 
is a decision maker. This second case shows that correct expecta- 
tions may depend on expectations of other agents' expectations. The 
third subsection looks at whether restrictions on higher order levels 
of expectations can be justified in terms of (common knowledge of) 
the rationality of individual agents. 
The Government and the Public as Two Rational Agents 
In an interesting article Frydman, O'Driscoll, and Schotter 
(1982) apply the so-called Newcomb's paradox to a case in which a 
monetary authority must make a decision in a situation in which its 
payoff is affected by whether or not its action is predicted by the 
public. They show that if the public has good predictive powers, a 
unique rational decision of the monetary authority may not exist. 
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To illustrate the argument I use the following simple, but widely 
used, new classical model, which was originally proposed by Lucas 
(1973). This model will be used to illustrate subsequent arguments 
as well. All variables refer to the same period t and are measured 
in logs. 
Y+ = Y* + ct(P-  pe) Ct > 0,  (1) 
yd = M-P+ V, (2) 
r = yd,  (3) 
where ys, yd are aggregate supply and demand; Y* is full-employ- 
ment output; P is the price level; /w is the price level expected by 
the public; M is the money stock, and V is a constant velocity of 
money circulation. 
Solving this system of equations yields 
P = (1/1 + ct)(M + V) + (ct/1 + ct) pe _ (1/1 + Ct) Y*. (4) 
It is assumed that the public knows the value of ct. Rational price 
expectations in the sense of REH can be calculated in the usual 
way by taking expectations of both sides of this equation and solving 
for P~: 
P~= M e+ V-Y* ,  (5) 
e = (M + o,M')/(1 + + (V - r * ) ,  (6) 
where M e, the level of the money stock expected by the public, is 
crucial for the formation of a price expectation. Using Equations (4) 
and (5) we arrive at the following solution: 
Y - Y* = ~(M-  Me)~(1 + 5) .  
This is the well-known result that, in Lucas's monetary model of 
the business cycle, only an unexpected monetary policy has an ef- 
fect on aggregate output. In order to facilitate the argument, sup- 
pose that the monetary authority has only two policy options avail- 
able. It can either choose a low level of money supply (Mr.) or a 
high level of money supply (MH). If the public correctly anticipates 
the monetary policy, then P = P~ and Y = Y*. Equations (5) and 
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(6) then reveal that, in the case of a low money supply, P* and P 
are lower than in the case of a high money supply. If a low money 
supply is expected, while the monetary authority chooses a high 
money supply, P > P" and Y > Y*. The reverse inequalities hold 
true if a high money supply is expected, while the monetary au- 
thority chooses a low level of the money supply. 
It is assumed that the monetary authority has a preference 
ordering over the four possible outcomes. This is described by the 
following matrix. 
Public 
Expect M L Expect M H 
Monetary 
Authority 
Choose ML U(ML, ML) U(ML, MH) 
Choose MH U(MH, ML) U(MH, Mn) 
In this matrix U(Mn, ML), for example, is the von Neumann-Mor- 
genstern utility of the monetary authority related to the situation 
in which the public expects ML and the authority chooses MH. Fol- 
lowing Frydman, O'Driscoll, and Schotter (1982) I assume that U(MH, 
ML) > U(ML, ML) > U(M~, MH) > U(ML, MH). 
Let to denote the (subjective) probability that the public cor- 
rectly anticipates the monetary policy. The monetary authority's ex- 
pected utility of choosing ML and MH can then be written as ¢oU(ML, 
ME) + {1 -- to) U(ML, MH) and (1 - to) U(MH, ML) + toU(MH, MH), 
respectively. If the public is a good predictor of the monetary pol- 
icy, that is, ff to is close to 1, then ML maximizes the authority's 
expected utility. ~ However, as U(MH, ML) > U(ML, ML) and U(MH, 
MH) > U(ML, MH), MH dominates ME. 
There has been much debate on Newcomb's paradox (see 
O'Flaherty 1985 for an overview). Rational expectations in the sense 
of REH clearly means that to is close to or equal to 1. In this case 
the authority's decision situation can be approached from two rel- 
evant theories concerning rational behavior. In the Bayesian view 
of rationality (see Tan and Werlang 1988) agents should maximize 
their (subjective) expected utility. This leads to the choice of ML. 
The other view is that agents should not choose a dominated strat- 
IML maximizes the authority's expected utility ff ¢o is such that to/(1 - ~) 
> [U(MH, ML) - U(ML, MH)]/[U(ML, ML) -- U(MH, Mu)l. 
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egy. The application of this Dominance Principle leads to the choice 
of MH. So, on the basis of considerations of rationality only it is 
neither clear what the monetary authority should do nor what the 
public should expect the authority to do. Of course, in specific cases 
the authority may use extra-rational processes (for example, rules 
of thumb) which prescribe a unique action. The public may know 
this and may use the knowledge to form their expectations. How- 
ever, these expectations do not follow from the description of the 
theory. The REH does not make much sense in these cases because 
relevant theories of rational behavior contradict each other, and 
processes which prescribe a definite choice are extra-rational. This 
conclusion holds in quite a number of models in which both the 
government and the public are regarded as rational agents. 
Rational Expectations as Nash Equilibrium 
Above we have concentrated on the interaction between the 
expectations of the monetary authority and the public. The public 
was regarded as one homogeneous group and the expectations of 
the public were represented by the expectations of one represen- 
tative decision maker. However, the assumption of price-taking be- 
havior implies that each supplier is negligibly small relative to the 
size of the economy. It is thus necessary to assume that a large 
number, say n, of suppliers exists who may have different expec- 
tations. In this subsection I concentrate on the interaction between 
expectations of different suppliers. In order to do so I rewrite 
Equation (1) as 
n 
ys = y ,  + a/n E {e -/~(i)}; a > 0,  (1') 
/= i  
where P~(i) is the price expectation held by supplier i. The price 
expectation for agent i that turns out to be correct ex post, pC'(i), 
is then equal to 
n 
e- ( i )  = e - (M + V - Y* )  
n+om-~ 
n 
n "~ o£n - -  o£ j# i  
However, if all suppliers have to form expectations at the same mo- 
ment in time they are not informed about the other suppliers" ex- 
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pectations. I will define an individual rational price expectation for 
agent i, P*e(i), as the best expectation agent i is able to form given 
the information available to him. Using Equations (1'), (2), and (3) 
we arrive at 
n 
n o~ 
ero( i )  - (M + V - r * )  + _ t * ( j ( i ) ) ,  (9) 
n+an-a  n ' l -an -a  
where P'(j(i)) is the expectation agent j ~ i is assumed to hold by 
agent i. 
The question we are interested in is whether REH is a logical 
consequence of the basic hypothesis that agents have individual ra- 
tional price expectations. Comparing Equations (5) and (9) imme- 
diately shows that this is not always the case. One may wonder 
under what condition individual rational price expectations do co- 
incide with REH, that is, when does 
Pre(i)= M + V-Y*  (10) 
hold true for all i. Simple algebra shows that this is the case if, 
and only if, 
_1 E I~(J( i ))= M+ V-Y* .  
n 1 j~i 
(11) 
This means that all individuals have to expect hat the average price 
expectation of all other agents equals the REH price expectation. 
An important special case occurs when all agents expect the REH 
price to prevail and this is expected by all agents. In this case there 
is a Nash equilibrium in expectations. Accordingly, the REH can 
be regarded as an equilibrium assumption (see also Evans 1983). 
Recent game theoretic literature reveals, however, that in general 
the Nash equilibrium concept is not a simple consequence of ra- 
tional behavior on the part of individuals. On the contrary, some 
coordinating device has to assure that individuals play Nash equi- 
librium strategies (see Tan and Werlang 1988 and Gul 1989). 
This result indicates that in a multi-individual economy indi- 
vidual rationality and knowledge of the true model are not sufficient 
to justify REH. All individuals have to expect that the average ex- 
pectation is in conformity with the REH. In other words, in order 
to justify the REH we have to make a stringent assumption about 
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expectations of expectations. 2 I f  the economy is supposed to consist 
of one individual, as is the case in many new classical models, these 
difficulties do not arise because the individual agent is then in a 
position to derive a unique relation between his individual expec- 
tations and "'aggregate" outcomes. In a multi- individual economy 
this is not possible because aggregate outcomes are also determined 
by other agents' expectations. 
Rational Expectations and Common Knowledge of  Rationality 
In the previous subsection we have seen that individual ra- 
tional price expectations coincide with the REH price expectation 
only if all individual agents expect the average price expectation to 
conform to the REH.  In some cases this str ingent assumption on 
second-order expectations can be der ived from the more funda- 
mental notion that individual agents are rational and that this ra- 
tionality is common knowledge. 3 This will be i l lustrated by means 
of the following simple partial equi l ibr ium model.  After this illus- 
tration I come back to the new classical model.  Aggregate supply 
in period t, q~, depends on the sum of the expected price p~(j). 
Demand,  qt a, depends on the realized price, Pt. The model  is as- 
sumed to be common knowledge. 
qa t = eq - 131P,, if pt <-- cq/131 ; a,, 131 > 0 ; 
q d = 0 ,  if p, > . , /13 , .  (12) 
n 
q~ = a2 + 132/n E Pt(j) et 2 < etl ; 132 > 0 ;  (13) 
j=l 
q; = q¢. (14) 
It is easy to see that the rational price expectation in the sense of 
REH equals Pt = (eq - et2)/(13x + 132). Any other expected price 
2It is interesting to remark that Keynes (1936) writes about higher order ex- 
pectations when discussing the famous beauty contest; see also Frydman (1982). 
3A fact is common knowledge ff not only everybody knows that it is true, but 
also that everybody knows that everybody knows it is true and so on. Bernheim 
(1984) and Pearce (1984) argue that common knowledge of individual rationality is 
logically equivalent to the concept of "'rationalizability.'" In the arguments hat fol- 
low I employ the concept of iterative limination of dominated strategies, which is 
very close to rationalizability (see Tan and Werlang 1988). 
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will not be realized. In general, the relation between prices and 
expected prices is the following: 
n 
p, = (% - c~)/13, - 132/n13, ~ p~(j). (15) 
j=l 
The argument runs as follows. Prices, hence the expected price, 
cannot fall below 0. Thus, all agents know that aggregate supply 
will be greater than % (see Equation [13]). This means that all sup- 
pliers know (on the basis of the demand curve) that price will never 
exceed (al - %)/13,. This fact is common knowledge. Accordingly, 
a rational supplier will never expect a price larger than (% - %) 
/13,, and he knows that the other suppliers will not expect a larger 
price as well. Using this knowledge and Equation (15), the sup- 
pliers know that (and they know that others know that, and so on). 
Pt  ~-  - -  
~1  - -  ~2  132 ~,  - -  ~2  
Applying the same argument as above, all suppliers also know that 
2 
pt<- - -  - 1 - - -  + 
13, 13, 
So, rational agents will not expect a price that does not satisfy this 
constraint. Eventually, that is, if the argument is applied an infinite 
number of times, all suppliers know that 
] 
P ' -< 13---S- 1 - - +  - + . . . .  
Provided that 132 < 131, this expression equals (%-  %)/(131 + 132), 
which is the equilibrium price. By the same token all suppliers know 
that p, --- (% - %)/(131 + 132). Thus, provided that 132 < 131, the only 
individual rational price expectation that is consistent with common 
knowledge is the rational expectations price.* Note that the argu- 
ment by means of which this conclusion is reached is similar to the 
familiar argument of the Cobweb Theorem. The condition [32 < 131 
is the stability condition of the Cobweb process. The Cobweb pro- 
cess is a dynamic process in real time with "'naive expectations," 
4For a more extended iscussion of the above argument, see Guesnerie (1989). 
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while the present argument concerns a dynamic process in notional 
time with "individual rational expectations." 
Returning to our simple new classical model one may wonder 
whether similar arguments apply to this case. At first sight such an 
application may seem to be appropriate. The relation between re- 
alized prices and expected prices is 
ll 
e = {M + v - Y* + ~1. ~ r(j)}/(1 + ~). 
j=l 
However, in the context of the new classical model there are no 
"natural constraints" on prices (as say P >- 0) that trigger off the 
elimination process. This is because the variables are measured in 
logs and logs can take on all real values. The reason for the model 
to be written in logs is that the demand equation is just a version 
of the Quantity Theory of Money. So, without changing the model 
there is no way to justify the assumption on second order expec- 
tations (or, equivalently, the Nash assumption) on the basis of com- 
mon knowledge of individual rationality. 
One way to trigger the elimination process is to allow for an 
independent authority, say the government, who announces cred- 
ible price and/or quantity restrictions. Let us imagine that the gov- 
ernment announces the quantity restriction that Y >- 0. In this case 
all firms know that the largest price to be expected is equal to 
M + V. Applying the above argument gives that firms know that 
prices have to fulfill the following requirement: 
e _ {M + V - Y* + ~(M + V)} / (1  + ~) = M + V - - -  
l+a  
Y~ . 
A subsequent application of the above argument gives 
1 a 
P<-M+V-~ 1 + ~ +  +. . .  Y* 
l+et  1+or  
=M+V-Y* .  
The restriction Y - 0, however, does not eliminate prices below 
M + V - Y*. In order to eliminate these prices as well, another 
restriction has to be added. It is easy to check that, for example, 
P >- 0 will do the job. 
If the variables in the model are not measured in logs the 
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supply equation can still be chosen to be of a linear form and the 
Quantity Equation is mv = pya, where lower case letters indicate 
variables not measured in logs. In this case there is a natural con- 
straint that prices have to be nonnegative, and it can be shown that 
this implies pe(i) >~ (mv)/y*, which is the equilibrium price. There 
is, however, no natural upper limit on prices so that the govern- 
ment has a role to play in this case as well. 
Of course, the introduction of a government in the above model 
is at odds with the new classical emphasis on the efficiency of lais- 
sez faire. However, without a central authority a decentralized pro- 
cess of expectations formation does not converge to expectations that 
are in conformity with the REH in this model. 
3. Market Clearing 
A Non-Individualistic Explanation of  Market Prices 
In the previous section we saw that the REH lacks a solid 
foundation in the theory of rational behavior once at least two ra- 
tional agents are distinguished in a model. The logical difficulties I
have pointed at do not occur in models with only one decision maker. 
Before analyzing whether there is a rationale in terms of individual 
behavior for the market clearing assumption, it is convenient o 
consider another fundamental difference between a Robinson Cru- 
soe economy and an economy consisting of two or more individuals. 
Robinson Crusoe may produce and consume goods, he may save 
them for future consumption, and so on. These are also the activ- 
ities individuals may undertake in an economy consisting of two or 
more individuals. However, in the latter type of economy individ- 
uals are also able to exchange goods in which case prices (or, bet- 
ter, exchange ratios) emerge. Exchange and exchange ratios have 
no meaning in a Robinson Crusoe economy. The interesting ques- 
tion from this perspective then is whether, in the context of general 
equilibrium theory, exchange and exchange ratios can be explained 
in terms of a decentralized process of individual decisions. 
This may seem to be a rather artificial way to characterize 
some of the difficulties (new classical) economic theory faces. I think, 
however, that it is not. Among others, Kydland and Prescott (1982) 
and Long and Plosser (1983) construct a Robinson Crusoe model of 
the business cycle. Such a model may be able to explain the actual 
pattern of consumption and production, but it cannot explain the 
level of exchange and exchange ratios in an economy because, be- 
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fore Friday arrives, there is no other person Robinson Crusoe can 
exchange goods with. Of course, an economist may explain Rob- 
inson Crusoe's behavior in terms of the theoretical concept of shadow 
prices. The only point I want to make here is that, in a Robinson 
Crusoe economy, there are no such observable things as prices which 
have to be explained. 
Prices are typically phenomena that arise from the interaction 
between different individuals. The most influential way in which 
prices are "'explained" in economics and the one new classical econ- 
omists often adhere to is to assume that observed prices are market 
clearing prices. Prices are determined by the impersonal forces of 
the market, that is, prices have to be such that all excess demands 
equal zero. But, and this is essential, the way the theory of indi- 
vidual economic behavior is formalized within the general equilib- 
rium method does not guarantee that prices bring about a situation 
in which excess demands equal zero; all individuals take prices as 
given. The general equilibrium method simply assumes the exis- 
tence of markets that coordinate individual economic activity (see 
also Janssen 1989). 
Of course, there are many economists who have expressed 
similar thoughts. Arrow (1959), in search of a rationale of the mar- 
ket clearing axiom, notes that this axiom is often regarded as the 
limit of a trial and error process known as the Law of Demand and 
Supply. He poses that this law is not on the same logical level as 
the hypotheses underlying the demand and supply schedules be- 
cause 
it is not explained whose decision it is to change prices . . . .  
Each individual participant is supposed to take prices as given 
and determine his choices as to purchases and sales accord- 
ingly; there is no one left over whose job it is to make a de- 
cision on price. (Arrow 1959, 43) 
In other words, from an individualistic point of view, the expla- 
nation of prices is left up in the air: a fictitious auctioneer and an 
Invisible Hand are non-individualistic, that is, centralized, devices. 
Individualistic Foundations for Market Clearing 
Returning to our new classical model, it is easy to see that 
the above observations challenge the individualistic foundations of 
Equation (3). If, however, individual agents are considered as price 
setters, then Equation (1) or (2) has to be adapted as well. In the 
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rest of this section I will consider a similar question to the question 
posed in Section 2, namely, whether the market clearing condition 
can be derived from the more fundamental notion that individual 
agents are rational and that this rationality is common knowledge. 
In order to do so, I consider firms as price setters. The form 
of the argument will first be illustrated by means of a simple model 
in which profit maximizing firms are assumed to produce a homo- 
geneous product. There are n such firms, and all firms have access 
to the same constant returns to scale production technology. Mar- 
ginal costs are constant and represented by % Demand will be equally 
divided among the firms that charge the lowest price. Aggregate 
demand is assumed to take the form of Equation (12) in which p 
has to be interpreted as the market price, that is, the lowest price 
charged by the firms. Furthermore, assume that firms can choose 
prices from a discrete price space only and let the distance between 
two adjacent prices be equal to p, where p is a small positive num- 
ber. 5 The above model is assumed to be common knowledge. 
The assumptions indicate that profits of individual firms are 
given by 
"0 ifpi > min P-i 
1 
~r,(p,, p_,) = n* (p' ~/)(al 13~p,) if p, min p_,, 
(p, - ~/)[ot - ~p,] if p, < min p_, 
where p_~ is the vector of prices set by all firms except firm i; min 
p_~ is the minimum of the elements of this vector; n* is the number 
of firms that charge the lowest price; and ~r~ is the profit made by 
firm /. 
We look for an iterative process that converges to the result 
that firms set their price equal to the market clearing price, which 
is % In the previous section the starting point of the iterative pro- 
cess was the recognition that prices have to be nonnegative. In the 
present case we are able to define the starting points more nar- 
rowly. It is clear that firms will never set a price below ~. At the 
other extreme, firms will never set a price above the monopoly 
SThe argument given below relies upon a discrete price space. This is because 
ff firms could pick a price out of a continuum the highest price that is left over 
after each elimination step is not well defined. 
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price, which is pm= (a~ + {3~)/213~.~ This can easily be  seen by 
dist inguishing the fol lowing three  cases: 
(a) ifmin p_~ < p~ ~r,(p~, p_~) = "rr,(p m, p_~) = 0 for all p~ > p~. 
f 
"~/rrt(Pl' p_~) = 01 for all p~ > p". 
Co) if rain p-~ pm 
[ ~ , (p ' ,  ~_,) = ~ (p, - ~) [~ - ~ ,~7]  > 0 
(c) if rain p_~ >pm 0 <- ~r~(p~, p_~) < ~rj(p ~, p_~) for all p, >pm.  
by the definition of p~. 
In each case ~ri(p~, p-j) -< "tr~(p m, p-j) for all p~ > pm. Hence ,  prof i t  
maximiz ing f irms never  set a pr ice that is larger  than pro. 7 
SO, f i rms only cons ider  pr ices between ~/ and pro. This fact is 
common knowledge.  In each success ive step of the i terated el imi-  
nation process at least one pr ice can be  sk ipped.  In o rder  to see 
this let ~0 be  the largest  pr ice after an arb i t rary  number  of  el imi-  
nation steps. Note  that for all p such that  ,/ + p -< ~ -< pm the 
following holds: 
(a) i fminp_~<~-p ,  thenlr~(~-p,p-~)=~r~(~,p- j )=O fo ra l lp~>~;  
1 
(b) i fminp_ ,=~-p ,  then~r~(~-p ,p_ , )=~-~(~-p-~)  
• (a~ - 131# + a2p) 
> ~r~(~, p_~) = 0 ; 
(c) ifmin P-i = P, f ~r,(~ - p, p_,) = (~ - p - ~)[a~ - ~,p  + a2p] then 1 
|~r , (~,  p_,) = -7  (~ - ~)[a~ - ~] ,  
k n~ 
6In order to have an interesting model there has to be at least one price greater 
than ~ that yields a positive demand. This gives us the condition al/{31 > ~/so that 
7The concept of weak domination is used here. BSrgers (1988) has shown that 
a slightly stronger concept of domination can be used. He also shows that the result 
does not depend on the order of elimination of dominated strategies. 
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and ~ri(~ - p, p-i) > ~ri(~, p-i), because (1 - 1/n*)(~ - "/)(al - 131~) 
> p(al - 2a21o + a2p + a2~/) for all values of 75 > ~/ + p and p 
close to zero. 
This means that for all firms ~ - p dominates ~. Applying the same 
argument a large number  of times leads to the result that the only 
strategy that is consistent with common knowledge of profit maxi- 
mizing behavior is to set Pl such that ~/ < Pi -< ~/ + P, that is, a 
price very close to the market clearing price. 
Cases in Which the Argument  Does Not Work  
After this demonstration of the argument it is t ime to see 
whether  it can be applied to the new classical model. In order to 
do so we have to look at whether  firms are able to determine an 
upper  bound for the prices rational firms may consider. In the pre- 
vious section I argued that, because the demand equation of the 
new classical model simply is the Quantity Theory of Money, there 
is no natural constraint on prices. Moreover,  the monopoly price is 
indeterminate because the log of a monopolist's revenue equals M 
+ V, whatever price is set. So, the monopoly price cannot serve 
as an upper  bound either. As in the previous section the govern- 
ment may be able to solve this d i lemma by announcing a credible 
price restriction. 
However,  in the context of the new classical model there may 
be another diflqculty in providing the market clearing condition with 
individualistic foundation. In the above example it is assumed that 
there are constant marginal costs. However,  models in the general 
equil ibrium tradition (hence, new classical models) frequently as- 
sume that there are decreasing returns to scale (for example, a qua- 
dratic cost function). In these cases the iterative process does not 
converge to the market clearing price. This is i l lustrated in the fol- 
lowing numerical example. Let  the demand function be given by 
D(p) = 8 - p; let p be equal to 1/2 and let there be 2 firms each 
having a cost function of the form c(qi) = q~. It is easily verified 
that the market clearing price equals 4 and the monopoly price equals 
6. If  we restrict our attention to prices between 3 and 6, the normal 
form of the game is as in Table 1. 
From the normal form it is immediately clear that pi = 6 is 
dominated by Pi = 51/2 • As this is common knowledge, the two 
firms know that their respective competitors will not set a price 
equal to 6. In a second round the firms will notice that pi 
= 51/z is dominated by p~ = 5. However,  none of the other prices 
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listed in the table can be eliminated in this way because there is 
a Nash equilibrium for any one of them. The reasons for this being 
the case do not depend on the specific numerical example that is 
chosen. The fundamental difference with the constant marginal costs 
case is that, in the case of decreasing returns to scale, the average 
cost of production increases with the production level. The firm 
that sets the lowest price has to serve all the demand. Under de- 
creasing returns to scale a firm's average cost is larger than the 
average cost it would have had if the two firms had set the same 
price. 
The above discussion shows that the market clearing condition 
can be provided with individualistic foundations, but only in some 
rather particular cases. If firms are price setters in a homogeneous 
market, the demand function has to be such that there is a finite 
monopoly price and the costs functions have to exhibit constant 
marginal costs. I think that these conditions are so restrictive that 
they support the conclusion that the market clearing condition can- 
not genuinely be regarded as a consequence of common knowledge 
of rational individual behavior. 
4. Another Argument for Microfoundations 
In the previous sections we have seen that the REH and the 
market clearing condition are not strongly supported by a theory of 
individual behavior. However, this should not be interpreted to mean 
that REH and market clearing are inconsistent with rational be- 
havior. I have only argued that in specific models REH or market 
clearing cannot be considered as a logical consequence of (common 
knowledge) of rational behavior. In a large number of models other 
expectations and other prices than the market clearing prices are 
consistent with common knowledge of rationality as well. Accord- 
ingly, embracing rational individual behavior does not imply that 
one has to stick to REH and market clearing. This leads me to the 
conclusion that "microfoundations" and "foundations in the theory 
of individual behavior" are not equivalent erms and that the re- 
ductionist credo alluded to in the introduction does not provide a 
rationale for this kind of mierofoundations. 
If this conclusion is granted, one is left with the question, 
what is accomplished by the microfoundations literature? I think an 
answer can be formulated along the following lines. Market clearing 
and perfect foresight (being the deterministic version of the REH) 
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have a longstanding tradition in economic theory. Even though the 
individualistic foundations of these notions are challenged, one can 
be of the opinion that they are useful tools in economic inquiry. 
From this point of view a lack of individualistic foundations is not 
really a problem. Market clearing and REH can be regarded as part 
of a research methodology in which these notions are generally ac- 
cepted. This is in line with Weintraub's view that general equilib- 
rium theory is a Lakatosian research program that can be applied 
to all kinds of economic problems (see Weintraub 1985). In this 
view the literature on microfoundations simply extends the domain 
of applications of the general equilibrium methodology to the field 
of macroeconomics, s 
After this brief outline of an alternative view of the micro: 
foundations literature, I turn to the question of whether this kind 
of microfoundations i  necessary in some respect. I think it is, but 
only in a very narrow sense. The microfoundations literature ex- 
tends the domain of the general equilibrium methodology similarly 
to the way Gary Becker's human capital theory has extended the 
domain of applications of this methodology. From the general equi- 
librium point of view it is hard to accept hat macroeconomics, which 
constitutes a large part of the domain of economic applications, falls 
outside its scope. This is the sense in which I would say that mi- 
crofoundations i necessary: it is a natural domain extension of the 
general equilibrium methodology. The term "microfoundations" is,
however, very misleading. It suggests that it builds macroeconomics 
only upon the fundamental notion of rational individual behavior. 
I have extensively argued that this is not what this literature ac- 
complishes. In the microfoundations literature, macroeconomic 
questions are treated by means of general equilibrium methods. Once 
the general equilibrium methodology is accepted, this kind of mi- 
crofoundations is indeed necessary. However those macroecono- 
mists who reject the general equilibrium methodology can still stick 
to other economic theories that are compatible with the fundamen- 
tal notion that individuals behave rationally. 
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SA more detailed escription of this view is given in Janssen (1991). 
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